Abstract: This paper explores potential endowment effects of contractual default rules. For this purpose, we analyze the Hadley liability default clause in a model of bilateral bargaining of lotteries against safe options. The liability default clause determines the right for the safe payoff option. We test the model in series of laboratory experiments. The results reveal a substantial willingness-toaccept to willingness-to-pay gap for the right to change lotteries against safe options. Even if we apply the incentive compatible Becker-DeGroot-Marschak value elicitation mechanism, there is a significant gap indicating a robust endowment effect caused by default rules. Differences of expected values of the lotteries and the safe options consistently decrease the gaps. Implications for applications of default rules in the law are discussed.
Introduction
Default rules represent an important element of (contract) law. They determine contractual obligations as long as the contractual parties do not explicitly override them by any other agreement. Their function is to fill gaps of incomplete contracts, to lower transactions costs by providing standard rules, and to provide guidance for the design of contractual agreements (Bechtold, 2010) . The positive effects of default rules may, however, come at a cost. Although default rules can be circumvented by contract, previous literature suggests that default rules may bias valuations such that the initial distributions of rights and obligations are likely to be sticky (Schwab, 1988; Korobkin, 1998b; Arlen et al., 2002; Sloof et al., 2007) . Final allocations of contracting and trading entitlements would thus not be efficient from the perspective of undistorted preferences (even in the absence of transaction costs).
The literature refers to this systematic preference bias as the endowment effect, that is, people's willingness to accept (WTA) parting with an entitlement exceeds their willingness to pay (WTP) to obtain it (Knetsch et al. 2001; Horowitz and McConnell, 2002) . The effect is commonly explained by loss aversion and fear of anticipated regret.
1 Despite its importance, research still provides inconclusive results.
That is why we investigate in this study the endowment effect in a particular legal context: we test whether stylized liability default rules create a WTA=WTP disparity. For our experimental setup we follow a mixed approach combining methods from experimental economics on the one hand (e. g., financial incentives, incentive-compability, sufficient practice and anonymity) with a legal frame on the other hand. The economic methods are used to ensure truthful revelation of valuation; the legal frame provides the adequate contextualization to measure the WTA=WTP gap of a legal default rule.
As such, our study connects two research traditions. In experimental economics, a large number of studies shows that the WTA=WTP disparity is context-dependent since the commodity used in the experiment (e. g., mugs, lotteries or money) affects the magnitude (even the existence) of the effect (Shogren et al., 1994) . Market experience (List, 2003) as well as agency relationships and voting -two institutions that mute regret - (Arlen and Tontrup, 2015) diminish the effect. Plott and Zeiler (Plott and Zeiler, 2005 argue that the gap reflects subjects' misconceptions, thus advocating for incorporating a list of experimental procedures into WTA=WTP experiments, which likely reduce misconceptions. The second stream of literature originates from law and economics where scholars conducted studies in legally framed settings (Korobkin, 1998a; Arlen et al., 2002; Sunstein, 2002; Sloof et al., 2007; Buccafusco and Sprigman, 2011) . The study by Korobkin (1998a) is most closely related to our experiment. While it finds a positive WTA=WTP disparity for a default liability clause, it only elicits hypothetical choices which may be subject to strategically over-and underbidding.
We study one particular prominent rule, the Hadley liability default rule. The Hadley rule originates from the case Hadley v. Baxendale (156 Eng.
1 Subjects anticipate that they may regret the decision to actively change the contract terms (Korobkin, 1998a; Arlen and Tontrup, 2015) . Yet, default rules are also known to prevent agents from truthfully revealing their true preferences due to strategic considerations. These may arise in response to relational factors and norms (Bernstein, 1993) , the fear of adverse inferences (Spier, 1992) , strategic behavior (Ayres and Gertner, 1989) , or externalities (Kahan and Klausner, 1997) . To focus on the preference bias, our design excludes any strategic considerations. Rep. 145, 1854) 2 and is extensively studied in the literature (Danzig, 1975; Ayres and Gertner, 1989; Bebchuk and Shavell, 1991; Korobkin, 1998b; Adler, 1999) . Specifically, we introduce two parties, player 1 and 2, having a shipment contract about a good; the delivery may be in-time or delayed. Both parties are endowed with an intangible legal rule 3 -the default liability rule, which settles which party bears the cost of delay. We elicit their valuations to change to an alternative rule which reverses the liability. The contracts are modeled as lotteries, that is, under full liability player 1 bears the cost of late delivery and is thus endowed with a binary lottery; player 2 is endowed with a safe outcome (and vice versa under the alternative liability rule). Since default rules differ in the value they assign to the contracting parties, we introduce lotteries with value differences along two dimensions, in the absolute value of the lottery and in the relative range between the lottery and the safe outcome.
To avoid other potential effects or misconceptions, we give subjects full information on the expected value of the liability rules. Thereby we can rule out any additional effect of ambiguity. For the same purpose, we exclude legal uncertainty on the question whether the damage was indeed foreseeable, 4 or any further negotiations that would naturally occur when contracting parties conclude a contract. Consequently, our study analyzes default rules under perfect information in an isolated setting. Therefore, we interpret our findings as an estimate for the isolated endowment effect of default clauses, while other -excluded -factors like ambiguity and legal uncertainty, are likely to influence it in reality.
We measure potential endowment effects of default clauses in two "extreme" experimental environments: one treatment condition (hereafter 2 A miller contracted a carrier to deliver a broken crank shaft to his mill, which was required as a model to build a new shaft. As the shipment was delayed, the miller sued the carrier for the subsequent lost profits while the mill was inoperative. The court's decision held in this case in favor of the carrier, establishing the common-law precedent of a default rule which guarantees liability only for foreseeable consequential damages. The consequential damage was argued to have been not foreseeable for the carrier, as he had not been informed about the use of the broken crank shaft. 3 Through physical possession a tangible good is more likely to induce a feeling of ownership, which was found to increase the endowment effect (Reb and Connolly, 2007) . Therefore, it is important to test whether subjects receiving intangible goods in the experiment still show any WTA=WTP disparity. 4 According to the Hadley doctrine, the carrier is liable for "foreseeable" damages, but not for "unforeseeable" damages. The Hadley rule specifies that liability for unforeseeable damages must be explicitly included in the contract in advance. Nevertheless, in reality contracting parties may assess differently ex post which damage was foreseeable. That is why eventually a judge needs to decide on that matter.
Testing the Endowment Effect denoted as bilateral) models an intuitive setting to reveal the subjects' valuation for the default rule. Both player 1 and 2 indicate their WTA, respectively, WTP, for exchanging the default rule against the alternative rule and an exchange takes place if WTP is larger or equal to WTA. We compare our results with data from a second more abstract experimental setting (hereafter denoted as unilateral) applying the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak value elicitation mechanism (BDM), which eliminates the strategic incentive to overstate a WTA in the bilateral treatment.
We observe significant WTA=WTP gaps for default rules in both treatment conditions consistently over time: neither the experience accumulated over time nor the value elicitation method influence the gap significantly. Median WTA=WTP ratios of 1.40 and 1.79 (bilateral and unilateral) are similar to results found for endowment experiments on lotteries. 5 In particular, our results show that the difference in expected value of liability rules affects the observed gap negatively. The higher differences in expected value appear to be more salient to subjects so that they elaborate more consciously on their valuations and are, in turn, less affected by the endowment effect. The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the experimental design and procedures and discusses subsequently theoretical and behavioral predictions. Section 3 includes the results and Section 4 concludes.
Experimental design
Our experiment employs a legal frame similar to the Hadley v. Baxley case. This design is not tailored to a specific application in law, but serves as a framework incorporating important features of many relevant legal situations.
In the experiment, two parties have a contract. The liability in case of damage is governed by a rule, which can be exchanged with an alternative rule. The two rules differ as to which party is held liable for the damage. Treatment conditions vary the elicitation mechanism. The bilateral treatment studies whether subjects exhibit a WTA=WTP gap with reference to the default liability rule in a bargaining of lotteries. In a second treatment (unilateral), the experiment is embedded into a more abstract setting. This treatment examines if the WTA=WTP disparity size changes when subjects use the incentive-compatible BDM procedure. In addition, variations within treatments explore whether 5 See for trading lotteries with unknown probabilites Eisenberger and Weber (1995) and Trautmann and Schmidt (2012) and for trades between risky commodities (i.e., players stated their WTA and WTP for not fully reducing the risk of the lottery) Schmidt and Traub (2009). differences in expected values of the liability rules affect the WTA=WTP disparity, and we control for the robustness of the WTA=WTP gap by excluding irrational WTA-or WTP-proposals. Details on the game are provided in Section 2.1, the experimental procedures are described in Section 2.2 and the hypotheses in Section 2.3.
The game
Let us first consider bilateral. There are two types of players, 1 and 2. Each player receives some money E. Players are then assigned to a contract that is governed by one of two different liability rules. Under rule liability the contract endows player 1 with lottery A and player 2 with lottery B. Under rule no liability, it is the other way around; player 1 is endowed with lottery B and player 2 with lottery A. The lottery A is a degenerate lottery ðp, X 1 ;1 − p, X 2 Þ with payoffs X 1 = X 2 : = X and probability p = 0.5; lottery B is a true lottery ðp, Y;1 − p, yÞ with payoffs Y > y and probability p = 1 − p = 0.5.
Before nature determines the outcome of the lotteries, player 1 states under liability her WTA 2 ½0, E to exchange lottery A with lottery B. At the same time player 2 states her WTP 2 ½0, E to change from lottery B to lottery A. The reverse case applies under no liability. WTA and WTP are compared pairwise. If WTA ≤ WTP, the liability will be exchanged, the seller receives WTA, while the buyer pays WTA as the price for the exchange. If WTA > WTP players keep their initial lotteries, and no price is paid.
6 Figure 1 illustrates the decision tree for bilateral (except the endowment E).
As mentioned earlier, the elicitation device used in bilateral is not fully incentive-compatible, as the player who determines WTA can increase the payoff by announcing a slightly greater d WTA 7 than her true valuation, WTA, for lottery A. Particularly, player 1 under liability and player 2 under no liability face the same problem as a bidder in a first-price procurement auction (see Appendix A for a discussion). However, the upward-biased stated WTA does not affect the other subject's stated WTP. While the stated WTA corresponds with a bid in a first-price procurement auction, the WTP position reflects a bid in a second-price auction:
6 The expected payoffs of the player indicating his WTA, π WTA , and the profit of the player indicating his WTP, π WTP , are π WTA = .5Y + .5y + E + WTA if WTA ≤ WTP and π WTA = X + E if WTA > WTP and π WTP = X + E − WTA if WTA ≤ WTP and π WTP = .5Y + .5y + E if WTA > WTP. 7 In this section, d
WTA indicates announced WTA, while WTA denotes the true valuation of the player. In the other sections, this distinction will not be applied for simplicity.
Testing the Endowment Effect second-price auctions eliminate strategic bidding and induce a truthful revelation of one's valuation of the object (Milgrom, 2004:9-10 ) (see Appendix A).
Let us now proceed with the unilateral treatment. The setting of unilateral equals bilateral's setting, except that this treatment applies the standard incentive-compatible BDM elicitation method for lottery valuations revealing the true value of individual WTA and WTP values (Plott and Zeiler, 2011; Isoni et al., 2011) . That is, the BDM mechanism (Becker et al., 1964) pits each seller and buyer against a random offer RO. All sellers stating bits lower than RO sell their initial lottery, receive the other lottery and the price RO. All buyers stating bids higher than RO receive the other lottery in exchange for their initial lottery and pay the price RO. Sellers who bid higher than RO, and buyers who bid lower than RO, do not transact. 8 Notice that random offers are uniformly distributed on a commonly known range, so that each price occurs with equal probability.
9
As bids are compared to a random offer generated by the computer, subjects in unilateral do not interact with other players (as compared to bilateral). Under the 8 Some scholars have raised theoretical objections about the incentive-compatibility of the BDM procedure. For example, Karni and Safra (1987) have shown that the dominant strategy of revealing one's true value fails to hold for preferences that cannot be expressed by expected utility. Noussair et al. (2004) compare the BDM mechanism and another incentive compatible mechanism, the Vickrey auction. They find that the Vickrey auction is more effective as an (induced) value elicitation device than the BDM process. However, the BDM mechanism remains widely used.
9 The expected payoffs of the WTA-indicating player, π WTA , and the WTP-indicating player, π WTP , are π WTA = .5Y + .5y + E + RO if WTA ≤ RO and π WTA = X + E if WTA > RO and π WTP = X + E − RO if WTP ≥ RO and π WTP = .5Y + .5y + E if WTP < RO.
assumption of stable preferences, constant absolute risk aversion, 10 and a utility maximization strategy, according to game-theoretical predictions, the subjects' WTP for the alternative liability rule should be equal to their WTA.
Experimental procedure
Our experiment is explicitly framed in a legal context: a customer (player 1) and a shipping company (player 2) form a contract about the shipping of a good.
11
The delivery incurs the risk of a delay (with a constant probability of 50 %) and resulting damages for the customer. The game is played repeatedly over 17 rounds, with the value of the good and the damage varying in each round.
12
In each round, either the rule liability or the rule no liability is effective. That is, either player 1 or player 2 is endowed with the safe option (namely, the degenerated lottery). Then, players may exchange lotteries. The 17 rounds of the experiment are divided into three, commonly known stages: a practice stage (three practice rounds), a low-stake stage (six rounds), and a high-stake stage (eight rounds). The 14 non-practice rounds contain seven different contracts. The contracts differ as to value for the good and for the damage (that is, the expected value of lotteries and spread of payoffs in lotteries). Each contract is assigned twice, in one round lottery A is the default and in another round lottery B. Therefore, we elicit for each player both the WTA and the WTP, allowing us to test for within-player WTA=WTP gaps.
13 Table 1 shows all seven contracts of the experiment (excluding practice), the differences of expected values between lottery A and lottery B (EðAÞ − EðBÞ), and the maximal rational offer (Max). In the following, all variables will be explained.
10 According to Isoni et al. (2011:997) , in expected utility theory it is common use to assume that absolute risk aversion decreases with increasing income. However, for experimental purposes an approximation through constant absolute risk aversion is often made because differences in wealth are small and the expected change in risk aversion is negligible. In addition, there is experimental evidence that the WTA-WTP gap remains significant even if a reversed income effect is present (for example, Schmidt and Traub, 2009) . 11 Customer and company are the English translations of the words we used in the German instructions. Note that in the rest of the paper we refer to company 1 and company 2 or player 1 and player 2 for convenience. 12 Probabilities are kept at 0.5 to reduce possible misconceptions. Plott and Zeiler (2005:540) argue that misconceptions are driven by a lacking understanding of probability. Therefore, only lotteries with equiprobability are used as we assume that subjects feel more at ease comparing two potential lottery outcomes of equiprobability. 13 We use the same number of rounds (both for small and high stakes) as Plott and Zeiler (2005) . This is the strongest experimental test as they do not find a statistically significant WTA=WTP gap in their repeated design.
Testing the Endowment Effect
As illustrated in Table 1 , there are three low-stake contracts for which WTA and WTP valuations are elicited in the first six rounds, and four high-stake contracts for which WTA and WTP valuations are elicited in the subsequent eight rounds. In the low-stake stage subjects receive an endowment of E = 0.5 experimental currency unit (ECU), while they receive 5 ECU in the high-stake rounds. To avoid potential order effects, the order of the rounds within the low-stake and highstake stages are drawn at random.
The next-to-last column of Table 1 shows the difference between the expected values of lotteries A and B, EðAÞ − EðBÞ. Some contracts (1, 3, 4, 5) have a positive difference between expected values. In these contracts, lotteries A and B differ not only with regard to the risk, but lottery A has a higher expected payoff. Those lotteries map exactly the Hadley liability default rule: liability guarantees a compensation of damages, that is, lottery A guarantees the larger payoff of the two possible outcomes of lottery B. Since there is an ongoing discussion in the literature whether offering both less risk and more payoffs systematically influences the size of the endowment effect (Schmidt and Traub, 2009) , we also test contracts with no differences in expected payoffs. Therefore, we can interpret the WTP of contracts 2, 6, and 7 (of course, also WTA in unilateral) as certainty equivalents and will thus be a measure for risk aversion.
The last column of Table 1 provides the upper bound of rational offers (Max) representing the maximal rational offer. The lower bound for all rounds is zero. The maximal rational offer represents the value that fully risk-averse subjects would just be willing to pay. It is defined by the maximal difference between the payoff of the degenerate lottery A and the payoffs of lottery B.
14 Some contracts 
14 For instance, if the degenerate lottery A provides a payoff of X, while the lottery B has a 50 percent probability of paying Y and a 50 percent probability of y with Y > y, the maximal rational offer is defined by the absolute value of maxðX − Y, X − yÞ. Valuations above this value violate rationality.
(2, 6, and 7) therefore allow conducting rationality checks. In these rounds, the maximal rational offer is lower than the endowment, so that subjects can make a higher than rational offer. Not all rounds allow for rationality checks, because we try to design a range as narrowly as possible to limit the risk the subjects face concerning the final price they will eventually pay. In the following, the general procedure of each treatment is explained. The experiment was conducted in the laboratory for economics and social science at the University of Hamburg in September 2012. It was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) . The experiment was organized and recruited with the software hroot (Bock et al., 2014) . A total of 107 students from various disciplines participated in the experiment.
Eight sessions, divided into five bilateral sessions and two unilateral sessions, were run. Prior to round one, subjects were randomly allocated their role; either they were player 1 (customer) or player 2 (company). Roles remained constant throughout the entire experiment. 90 subjects participated in bilateral and 17 subjects participated in unilateral. In the bilateral treatment, subjects were randomly matched in pairs from matching groups of six subjects. This alternating allocation prevented subjects from learning too much about the other subjects' behavior. In our analysis, each group of six players represents one independent observation, leaving us with 15 independent observations in bilateral. In the unilateral treatment, every individual represents one independent observation, yielding 17 independent observations in unilateral.
At the beginning of each experimental session, subjects enter the laboratory where each subject draws a number card that determines their booth. The random drawing ensures anonymity. Subjects are guaranteed that no other subject will be able to identify their actions or payoffs. Subsequently, written general instructions (see Appendix C) are distributed to the subjects and read out loud by the experimenter. The legal context is introduced to the subjects by the written instructions, which frames the game as a shipping contract under liability or no liability. The general instructions present the subjects with the game and give numerical examples to provide subjects with concrete illustrations of the WTA=WTP elicitation procedure. To familiarize the subjects with the game and the value elicitation mechanism, we employ instructions with examples, control questions which need to be answered correctly, and three training rounds.
Subjects received a non-performance-related show-up fee of 5 Euros, and the amounts earned from the experiment were exchanged at a rate of 4 ECU = 1 Euro. The sum of the show-up fee and the amounts earned from two randomly determined rounds (one low-stake and one high-stake round) determined the final payoff (to avoid effects of accumulated profits) which averaged 9.10 Euros and ranged from 7.60 Euros to 10.50 Euros. On average, one session lasted 60 minutes.

Game-theoretical and behavioral predictions
In the following we will derive predictions for the expected WTA and WTP valuations in bilateral and unilateral. Game theory predicts that a subject's WTA for the alternative liability rule is higher from the WTP in bilateral, whereas in unilateral WTA should be equal to WTP. In bilateral, the endowment effect could amplify the WTA=WTP gap resulting from the incentives of the elicitation mechanism; in unilateral, the endowment effect could create the gap. The effect emerges because the subject's valuation of the contract terms changes once the default contract becomes part of the individual's endowment. The individual then attributes a higher value to the entitlement (Thaler, 1980) . However, as explained in the literature review, it is not clear ex ante whether contract default rules will evoke such a change in valuation, as default rules only influence the owner's payoff probabilistically, that is, they materialize only in the bad state of nature yielding the small payoff y. As it is still debated in which contexts and for which items such a disparity exists, our experiment aims to contribute to the literature by testing for the existence of WTA=WTP gaps for default rules.
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Hypothesis 1: On average, the subjects' WTA is higher than the subjects' WTP for a liability rule change in bilateral and unilateral.
We will test two hypothesis concerning the potential sources of the endowment effect. The first one addresses the role of misconceptions. They can be caused by a failure to understand the elicitation mechanism (Plott and Zeiler, 2011) . In turn, experience might decrease the size of the effect. By playing a game for several rounds, subjects should learn to assess the consequences of their choices and gain confidence in evaluating the contracts. 16 If the WTA=WTP gap is indeed caused by misconceptions, it is likely that responses in earlier rounds are more affected than those in later rounds. By contrast, experience may also increase the WTA=WTP gap. Earlier results suggest that subjects frequently evaluate the regret as greater when the 15 As contracts are intangible goods, it is useful to distinguish between valence (or desirability) and possession loss aversion. Brenner et al. (2007) introduce this distinction: valence loss aversion (VLA) puts greater weight on changes in valence (i.e. valence loss looms larger than valence gains), whereas possession loss aversion (PLA) proposes more weights on items leaving one's possession. Since we model contracts as lotteries, we consider to measure a VLA for an unattractive item (i.e., the cover for the cost of delay) for which Brenner et al. (2007) predict a "normal" endowment effect (in contrast, there seems to be a "reversed" endowment effect based on PLA for unattractive items; see Brenner et al. (2007) ). unwanted consequences follow from action rather than from inaction and the subjects might therefore fear ex-post regret (Korobkin, 1998a) . 17 In our experiment, unwanted consequences triggering ex-post regret could follow losses induced by a change from the sure lottery A to the risky lottery B. This may result in a higher WTA. On the other hand, we do not expect a higher WTP for subjects initially endowed with lottery B as the unwanted consequences that may appear if subjects keep this lottery would follow from inaction. In order to control for practice and/or regret effects, the influence of time on the WTA=WTP gap will be evaluated in a regression analysis testing:
Hypothesis 2: A WTA=WTP disparity exists, but decreases over time.
Finally, we want to analyze whether variations in the payoff structure of the contracts influences the WTA=WTP gap size. If subjects form their preferences for the contracts on the spot, they may be influenced by cues of the decision problem. Peters et al. (2003) explain a WTA=WTP gap by the salience of different numeric cues. A large difference in expected value may appear salient to the subjects. With higher salience, subjects are more likely to make a high effort when elaborating their valuations than subjects endowed with contracts that contain lotteries of the same expected value. This may reduce the influence of a psychological bias, such as the endowment effect. One could therefore assume that the endowment effect is less pronounced when the contract contains lotteries of large differences in expected values. Of course, a result showing that endowment effects decrease with increasing monetary consequences (namely, expected payoff differences) may be a positive sign for law-making. Subjects' decisions on fundamental problems will be less affected by the endowment effect. Hence, we examine
Hypothesis 3: The difference in expected values between lotteries in contracts negatively affects the WTA=WTP gap size.
Experimental results
We start our analysis by investigating WTA and WTP valuations using nonparametric tests and conduct a regression analysis to estimate the effects of treatment variations in Section 3.1. In Section 3.2 we explore the difference between WTA=WTP gaps measured within the same subject or between subjects, which might differ in size, and perform a robustness check for irrational responses. We conclude with an evaluation of the hypotheses.
Descriptive statistics and non-parametric tests
In the following, we present the descriptive statistics of bilateral and unilateral. Table 2 summarizes WTA and WTP for contracts 1 to 7 (#) in bilateral and unilateral and shows the number of independent observations (n) for each valuation, the difference between the expected value of the lotteries (Δ EV), the mean, the median and the standard deviation (SD) of participants' reported valuations. It Table 2 : WTA and WTP valuations for contracts.
bilateral unilateral
Low-stake High-stake Low-stake High-stake Test based on signed ranks (two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test). Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. In bilateral WTA and WTP values are calculated as the average of all matching groups' average WTA and WTP. The WTA=WTP ratio is calculated first for each matching group and then averaged over all matching groups. In unilateral the WTA=WTP ratio was calculated first for each individual and then averaged over all individuals.
also shows the results of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test under the null hypothesis that the two corresponding median WTA and median WTP valuations are identical. For each contract, the table also includes the mean and median of the "standardized WTA=WTP" disparities. Standardized WTA=WTP disparities are calculated as ratios following Harless (1989) , Plott and Zeiler (2005) , Traub (2009), and Isoni, Loomes, and Sugden (2011) .
As mentioned earlier, we take the mean of each matching group of six players as one independent observation in bilateral. As there are two types of players in this treatment whose valuations for the same contract are elicited in different rounds, one independent observation is constructed by taking the arithmetic mean of the valuations given by the three player 1 subjects elicited in one round, as well as the valuations given by the three player 2 subjects elicited in the corresponding round.
18
In bilateral the overall median WTA=WTP amounts to 1.40 ECU (mean 1.43). For the low-stake contracts, the median amounts to 1.29 (mean 1.38), while the median of the high-stake contracts is 1.44 (mean 1.46). The median WTA is significantly greater than the median WTP at the one-percent level in all comparisons. Thus, the results of the Wilcoxon test support the hypothesis that the two dependent samples (WTA and WTP for each contract) were drawn from nonidentical distributions.
In unilateral the median WTA=WTP over all contracts is 1.79 (mean 2.16), which is 0.39 points higher than the median of bilateral (mean is higher by 0.73 points). 19 The difference in the median gap, however, is not significant.
20
18 For example, in one specific round, say 1, contract 3 is randomly chosen to be played. Player 1 subjects are endowed with lottery A and indicate their WTA, while player 2 subjects are endowed with lottery B and state their WTP (and vice versa in another round, say 2). Consequently, the matching group WTA mean is constructed by taking the average of the WTA valuations of player 1 subjects from round 1 and the WTA valuations of player 2 subjects from round 2 (and vice versa for the matching group WTP mean).
19 The large difference in the mean WTA=WTP gap, yet lower difference in the median between treatments can be explained by the greater degree of aggregation in bilateral. In unilateral high individual WTA=WTP gaps affect more strongly the overall mean than in bilateral, where we average over six values. Since the median is less affected by extreme values, the median is more adequate to compare both treatments. Note, for example, that in Contract 7 the mean WTA=WTP gap is 6.14 in unilateral, which is driven by two outlier subjects who have each a gap of over 10. 20 We conducted a median test on the null hypothesis that the WTA=WTP gaps of both treatments were drawn from distributions with the same median. On the basis of a continuity corrected chi-squared test statistic the hypothesis cannot be rejected at a significance level of 10 percent for any pair of rounds.
Testing the Endowment Effect
In unilateral the median WTA=WTP amounts to 1.58 (mean 1.63) for the lowstake contracts and 1.63 (mean 2.53) for the high-stake contracts. 21 The results of the Wilcoxon test show that the median WTA significantly exceeds the median WTP in most comparisons at the one-or five-percent level. However, this does not hold true for contract 1. The results in unilateral show a lower degree of significance than the ones detected in bilateral which is probably due to a decreased variation among the independent observations, since we take, in bilateral, the average over six players as one independent observation. To explore whether the different elicitation methods of bilateral and unilateral result in different valuations, a two-tailed Mann-Whitney ranksum test examines the hypothesis that the valuations under bilateral are equal to the valuations under unilateral.
22 Surprisingly, there are only unsystematic differences between the treatment conditions. We find a higher average WTP in round eight of bilateral, compared with unilateral, at a significance level of one percent. All other differences -particularly the ones for WTA -are not significantly different even at a ten-percent level. Therefore, it seems that the constant change between the incentive-incompatible WTA and incentive-compatible WTP elicitation in bilateral eliminates systematic treatment differences. Rather, as we will show in the subsequent section, another factor -the differences in expected values -crucially influences differences between WTA and WTP in both treatment conditions. Overall, a comparison with other studies summarized in the meta study by Horowitz and McConnell (2002) yields that our results lie below the median ratio for lotteries (1.66), as well as below the median ratio for ordinary private goods (2.26) (Horowitz and McConnell, 2002, p. 433) . 23 Yet, the explanatory power of this comparison is limited, since the studies employ different elicitation mechanisms and some experiments only elicit hypothetical choices. Contrasting our results with other gaps for lotteries from experiments that employ a similar elicitation procedure (such as the BDM procedure), we find that these ratios 21 Hence, it could be the case that embedding our experiment into the legal context increased the gap in comparison to earlier abstract trades of lotteries. Yet, this increase could be also attributed to the fact that we ask for subjects' WTA for accepting the ownership of lottery and their WTP for buying into a safe payoff, while previous studies analyzed the contrary case.
With regard to the hypotheses in section 2.3, the non-parametric tests affirm Hypothesis 1. We will now turn to Hypothesis 2 that the WTA=WTP disparity decreases over the course of rounds by conducting a regression analysis on the WTA=WTP gap.
We employ a mixed effects model that allows modeling random effects on the group and on the individual level. In total, there are 32 groups composed of 15 matching groups from bilateral, and 17 groups from unilateral where each group contains one subject. Since WTA and WTP values for each lottery pair are elicited in different periods, the WTA=WTP gap cannot simply be assigned to one period. To counter this problem, we use two variables. First, we assign the gap to the period where the first value of the gap was elicited (variable period). Additionally, the absolute difference of periods between the WTA and WTP measurement will be captured in the variable distance, defined as distance = period WTA − period WTP j j . 24 In addition, we include the dummy variable unilateral (which equals 0 for observations from bilateral and 1 from unilateral), ΔEV (the difference between the expected values of the lotteries included in contract A and B), and a dummy variable, highstake (which equals 0 for all lowstake rounds and 1 for all high-stake lotteries). Table 3 reports the results for regressions (1)- (4) and a joint test for the goodness of fit for the complete model (Wald test).
25
The coefficients of the variable unilateral as well as the ones of the interaction terms turn out to be insignificant in all regressions, which indicate that the different value elicitation methods applied in bilateral and unilateral do not significantly alter the gap. This result may be surprising given the incentives for truthful revelation of valuations in bilateral and unilateral, but adds to the 24 Thus, period runs from 1 to 13, while it never takes the value 14, as the last period always elicits the second value of the gap. Distance runs from 1 to 7, as the maximal distance between WTA and WTP periods within a block (lowstake/highstake) is seven periods. 25 In the Appendix B2 we report the complete table and additionally a regression including four interaction terms, highstake unilateral, ΔEV unilateral, period unilateral, distance unilateral.
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observations of other authors indicating that the BDM mechanism leads to behavior which does not necessarily correspond to theoretical predictions (Noussair et al., 2004) .
Most importantly, the variable ΔEV exerts the strongest impact on the WTA=WTP gap. Its coefficient is negative and significant at a five-percent level and affects consistently the gap in models (3) and (4) by roughly − 0.5. The negative sign demonstrates that a high difference in expected values between the lotteries reduces the size of the gap. This result affirms Hypothesis 3: the more the alternative rule differs from the default rule, the less subjects' valuations diverge. This result points out that subjects may act more rationally for higher differences in expected value.
The coefficients of variable highstake in (2) and (3) suggest a positive influence of high-stake lotteries on the size of the gap. However, this effect disappears once we control for timing of the elicitation (4). The variable period is significantly (at margin) and positively correlated with the gap, which (weakly) 
. .** .*** .*** Notes: Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. This table reports coefficients using a mixed effects regression model (including random effects at the subject level and matching group level) with WTA/WTP gaps as dependent variable. unilateral is a treatment dummy variable taking the value of 1 for unilateral and 0 for bilateral, period assigns the period the gap was first elicited and and distance the absolute difference in periods between WTA and WTP valuations. highstake is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for high stake periods and 0 for low stake periods. ΔEV depicts the absolute difference in expected value of the lotteries. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses.
signifies that the later the valuations were elicited, the higher the gap is. The coefficient of the variable distance is as well significant at a ten-percent level. This indicates that the more periods have passed between both WTA and WTP measurements, the higher the gap is. This result affirms the finding by Sayman and Öncüler (2005) that subjects try to give consistent valuations. The more distant the valuations are in time, the more the subjects may forget about their previous valuation. Hence, we cannot confirm Hypothesis 2 as the gap does not decrease over time. This result stands in contrast to the positive effect of experience found by Plott and Zeiler (2005) . However, it is in line with results of a meta-study by Horowitz and McConnell (2002) , who find mixed effects of repetition on the WTA-WTP disparity.
Robustness checks
In this section we conduct two robustness checks. First, we investigate if it matters whether the WTA=WTP disparity is constructed as a within gap or a between gap. This comparison is important because in within designs subjects might realize that WTP and WTP tasks technically pose the same question and for the sake of consistency offer the same responses. Second, we control if the observed WTA=WTP disparity is caused by irrational valuations, which might weaken the power of the previously found results.
In bilateral we can observe between-subjects' WTA=WTP ratios along withinsubjects' WTA=WTP ratios. For almost all contracts we find in a between-subjects comparison that WTA significantly exceeds WTP at the 1 or 5 percent level (except contracts 6 and 7).
26 Figure 2 compares the within-subjects' and between-subjects' WTA=WTP and shows their cumulative probability distribution. 27 The distributions seem very similar and also a Wilcoxon signed rank test cannot reject the hypothesis that the within-subjects' gap is equal to the between-subjects' gap of the 26 The table B1 presenting the summary statistics of the between-subjects WTA=WTP ratio, called in short betweenWTA=WTP gap, can be found in the Appendix B. Since between gaps are based on WTA and WTP valuations elicited in the same period, these gaps are not averaged over the whole matching group, but only over each subgroup (a subgroup contains three player 1 or three player 2 subjects per group). Thus, for each contract, a between gap equals the mean of three WTA valuations (belonging to one subgroup) divided by the mean of three WTP valuations (from the other subgroup) elicited in the same period. Therefore, in each group the between-subjects WTA=WTP ratio is elicited twice. 27 Gaps from all subjects over all rounds in bilateral are included in the figure. To have a meaningful comparison with the between gaps, the within gaps are also constructed on the basis of the subgroup.
Testing the Endowment Effect corresponding contract. Thus, we cannot confirm the results of the meta-study by Sayman and Öncüler (2005) that show a significant difference between withinsubjects' and between-subjects' WTA=WTP gaps. While the non-parametric tests reject on an aggregate level that within-subjects ratios differ from between-subjects ratios, our regression analysis indicates that subjects' valuations on the withinsubject level are slightly affected by the distance between WTA and WTP valuations. Our second robustness check controls for the effect of excluding irrational valuations. Valuations are irrational whenever they lie outside the bounds of the lottery value, which means that these valuations will create losses for the subject if a liability rule exchange takes place. Irrational valuations are problematic because they might indicate that subjects do not understand the task, the concepts of randomization or probabilities. Therefore, we implemented irrationality checks in our design.
We define irrational valuations according to values above Max, the maximal difference in payoffs between lotteries.
28 By design, such irrational valuations could only be observed for the contracts 3, 6, and 7. For all other contracts, the maximal valuation is within the rational range as all possible valuations are limited by the endowment given at the beginning of each round. 28 See footnote 14 for a definition of Max. 29 Notice Max is only an imperfect criterion for irrationality of WTA in bilateral. That is, valuations higher than Max in this treatment could also result from strategic incentives of the elicitation mechanism paired with extreme risk aversion (that is, if subjects are very risk-averse, so that their individual WTA almost equals X − y, WTA could exceed Max). Therefore, we potentially overestimate results on irrationality based on WTA in bilateral. However, since Figure 3 shows that for some contracts large fractions of valuations are irrational. 30 For WTA, the percentages of irrational offers lie between 24 % and 59 % for the contracts in question. For WTP, the numbers are substantially lower and range between 0 and 35 %. While irrational valuations are also found in Plott and Zeiler (2011) and Isoni et al. (2011) , their levels are lower than ours. This may be related to the fact that bargaining experiments are rarely run at the laboratory for economics and social science at the University of Hamburg, and that this type of experiment is completely new to all participants. The disparity of irrational offers between the low-stake contract 3 and the high-stake contracts 6 and 7 may be explained by the different opportunities of making an irrational offer. In the high-stake tasks, subjects dispose of a higher endowment, which increases the opportunity to make an irrational offer by three times compared to the low-stake tasks. 31 The crucial question is whether the large degree of irrationality simply causes the WTA=WTP gap (particularly since irrationality affects WTA more likely than WTP). there is little difference between the percentages of irrationality between bilateral and unilateral, particularly for the numbers based on WTA, we conclude that this effect is rather minor. 30 Figure 3 shows irrational valuations on an individual basis. 31 For the low-stake contracts, the endowment amounts to 0.5 ECU and an offer is defined as irrational if it is greater than 0.4 ECU. For the large stake contracts, where the endowment amounts to 5 ECU, an offer is defined as irrational if the offer is greater than 2 ECU. Table 4 shows WTA=WTP gaps for bilateral as well as unilateral excluding irrational valuations. 32 For bilateral the significance of the results is not changed, but for unilateral it is substantially reduced (yet only for one contract does the gap turn out to be insignificant). This difference can be partly explained by the reduced number of independent observations in unilateral. 33 This result supports the claim that the gap is partly driven by irrational valuations. However, they do not account fully for the observed gap. Test based on signed ranks (two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test). Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. In bilateral WTA and WTP values are calculated as the average of all matching groups' average WTA and WTP. The WTA=WTP ratio is calculated first for each matching group and then averaged over all matching groups. In unilateral the WTA=WTP ratio was calculated first for each individual and then averaged over all individuals.
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32 The WTA=WTA gaps are based on matching group mean valuations for bilateral. When constructing the mean, irrational individual valuations were excluded. 33 The number of independent observations is more reduced in unilateral than in bilateral, as we rely on individual valuations in unilateral, but lose fewer observations in bilateral since we use matching group averages.
Overall, the results confirm Hypothesis 1 by detecting a statistical significant difference between WTA and WTP valuations. The regression analysis suggest that the different elicitation mechanisms do not produce significantly different WTA=WTP gaps. Hypothesis 2 assumes that the gap decreases over time. We found no indication for this hypothesis. On the other hand, we do not have consistent evidence for an increase of the gap over periods. Thus, neither we can support the argumentation that the gap is driven by misconceptions, nor do the results suggest that the gap disappears due to subject's learning. Hypothesis 3, however, is affirmed by the regression analysis. The differences in expected value turn out to be significant in the regression. It appears that the more both lotteries differ in terms of expected payoff, the less subjects are affected by the endowment effect.
Conclusion
This paper has shown that default rules are more powerful than their theoretical justification suggests at first sight. Created for contract law simply to address gaps in incomplete contracts, default rules do create distortions at closer inspection. This paper has used an experiment to show that the default rule creates an endowment effect: the minimal WTA for a loss of the default rule was found to be greater than the maximal WTP to obtain the same rule when it is not set as default.
Our experimental design takes into account previous methodological concerns (e. g., practice rounds) raised by economic scholars Zeiler, 2005, 2007) . We contribute to the evidence of prior experiments in law (Korobkin, 1998b; Sunstein, 2002) by showing that the gap is not driven by a lack of experimental controls. With our legally framed design we also speak to the legal critique advanced by Tor (2007) who stresses the importance of using legal context. Using a mixed design (abstract contracts in form of lotteries with a legal frame) gives us two advantages. First, the results of our study can be compared to WTA=WTP studies on lotteries, so that they add to the general literature on the endowment effect for goods of uncertain value. Second, the abstract legal frame embedded the experiment in a legal context without triggering any reference to a particular legal system, which could have evoked other psychological biases such as the status quo bias. Recall that modeling contracts as lotteries implies for participants that they experience losses in terms of valence, but not in terms of possession. Therefore, the endowment effect we document here results from valence loss aversion, which -in contrast to possession loss aversion -is likely to influence the evaluation of all types of intangible legal rules. Whilst one could suspect in principle that our design draws participants' attention to the lotteries rather than the exchange of legal rules, this reduced design is necessary to isolate the preferential bias for trading intangible rules. Indeed, we find a gap between WTA and WTP that is statistically significant and persistent over time. The median gap amounts to 1.31 in bilateral and 1.45 in unilateral, so that our gaps are slightly larger than the ones found in similar studies that test the endowment effect for lotteries (e. g., Plott and Zeiler, 2005 , report medians of 1.15-1.16). Thus, if at all, our data suggest an additional increase from imposing legal context onto lotteries in our experimental setting.
We conducted two additional robustness checks. First, we controlled for irrational valuations. Although a substantial percentage of irrational gaps is found, the results show that irrationality is not the driving force of the gap: even in the sub-sample of only rational valuations, there is a significant WTA=WTP gap. Second, gaps constructed as between or within gaps do not significantly differ. This result emphasizes that an endowment effect cannot only be observed within individuals, but also seems to persist over a population average. Third, a large difference in expected values between the lotteries persistently reduces the size of the gap.
What are legal consequences of our results? Default rules are not innocent. The experimental results emphasize the need for a theory of an optimal design of default rules.
34 Bechtold (2010) claims that the majority of experimental studies justify the construction of default rules according to the majoritarian opinion because subjects opt out of default rules less often than predicted. However, our experiment also points out that default rules affect stated valuations, which leads to the problem that, under different default rules, agents agree on different contract terms. Therefore, it might be problematic to base the optimal design of default rules only on the revealed interests of agents; a normative justification of a default rule may also be necessary. Independently from the issue of optimal default rules, our results suggest a potential way to reduce the biased valuation of default rights due to endowment effects: our results show a consistent decrease of the WTA=WTP gaps for contracts with higher differences of expected values in the underlying lotteries. As mentioned earlier, we interpret this finding in a way that subjects are more likely to make a high effort when elaborating their valuations for higher salience. In other words, the gap decreases if subjects work hard on their WTA or WTP statement. This may serve as an opportunity for lawyers and policy-markers. If one urges contracting parties to agree or to justify default clauses explicitly, this may also increase the effort parties put into the contract thereby hopefully reducing the influence of psychological biases such as the endowment effect. The proof of this claim, however, lies beyond the scope of this paper and should be a promising field of further research. Future work could, for example, study in detail the role of cognitive effort. Our interpretation suggests that higher differences in expected value decrease the endowment effect due to more cognitive effort. Experiments that measure reaction times or eye movements could adequately test this hypothesis. Table B : Between-subjects WTA=WTP ratios for contracts in bilateral.  Test^ *** ** *** *** *** *** *** *** ** ** *** *** Notes: 1 Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Test based on signed ranks (twotailed Wilcoxon signed rank test). 1st stands for the first time the between WTA=WTP ratio was elicited in each group and 2nd for the second time,respectively. In bilateral WTA and WTP values are calculated as the average of all matching groups' average WTA and WTP. The WTA=WTP ratio is calculated first for each matching group and then averaged over all matching groups.
B Additional tables
C English translation of the instructions for the bilateral treatment
Please find the English translation of the original German instructions of the bilateral treatment in the Supplementary Material. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. This table reports coefficients using a mixed effects regression model (including random effects at the subject level and matching group level) with WTA=WTP gaps as dependent variable. unilateral is a treatment dummy variable taking the value of 1 for unilateral and 0 for bilateral, period assigns the period the gap was first elicited and and distance the absolute difference in periods between WTA and WTP valuations. highstake is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for high stake periods and 0 for low stake periods. ΔEV depicts the absolute difference in expected value of the lotteries. The remaining variables are interaction terms. Standard errors are indicated in parentheses.
